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Purpose
This publication is the fifth Part in a series of Recommendations regarding modes of operation of symmetric key block ciphers.
Authority
This publication has been developed by the This publication may be used by nongovernmental organizations on a voluntary basis and is not subject to copyright in the United States. Attribution would, however, be appreciated by NIST.
Introduction
The XTS-AES algorithm is a mode of operation of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [1] algorithm. The Security in Storage Working Group (SISWG) of the P1619 Task Group of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc (IEEE) developed and specified XTS-AES in IEEE Std. 1619-2007 [2] . This Recommendation approves the XTS-AES mode as specified in that standard, subject to one additional requirement on the lengths of the data units, which is discussed in Section 4 below.
The XTS-AES mode was designed for the cryptographic protection of data on storage devices that use of fixed length "data units," as defined in Ref. [2] . Note that other approved cryptographic algorithms continue to be approved for such devices. The XTS-AES mode was not designed for other purposes, such as the encryption of data in transit.
The XTS-AES mode is an instantiation of Rogaway's XEX (XOR Encrypt XOR) tweakable block cipher [3] , supplemented with a method called "ciphertext stealing" to extend the domain of possible input data strings. In particular, XEX can only encrypt sequences of complete blocks, i.e., any data string that is an integer multiple of 128 bits; whereas for XTS-AES, the data string may also consist of one or more complete blocks followed by a single, non-empty partial block. (The acronym XTS stands for the XEX Tweakable Block Cipher with Ciphertext Stealing).
The specification of the ciphertext stealing method in Ref. [2] includes an ordering convention for the final complete block and partial block of the encrypted data string. A different convention, in which the order is swapped, may be desirable in some cases. The specification in Ref. [2] provides flexibility in the physical location of these elements, as long as interoperability is not compromised, as discussed in Section 5.
The XTS-AES mode provides confidentiality for the protected data. Authentication is not provided, because the P1619 Task Group designed XTS-AES to provide encryption without data expansion, so alternative cryptographic methods that incorporate an authentication tag are precluded. In the absence of authentication or access control, XTS-AES provides more protection than the other approved confidentiality-only modes against unauthorized manipulation of the encrypted data.
Annex D of Ref. [2] discusses in detail the design choices for XTS, including the resistance to manipulation of the encrypted data, and their ramifications for the incorporation of XTS-AES into an information system. Prospective implementers of XTS-AES should consider this information carefully to ensure that XTS-AES is an appropriate solution for a given threat model.
Conformance
An instance of an XTS-AES implementation is defined by the following three elements, as specified in Ref. [2] :
1) a secret key, 2) a single, fixed length for the data units that the key protects, 3) an implementation of the XTS-AES-Enc procedure or the XTS-AES-Dec procedure, or both, for the key and the length of the data units.
The length of the data unit for any instance of an implementation of XTS-AES shall not exceed 2 20 AES blocks. Note that Subclause 5.1 of Ref. [2] recommends this limit but does not require it.
An implementation of the XTS-AES encryption mode may claim conformance with this Recommendation if every supported instance satisfies this length requirement for a data unit, in addition to all of the requirements in Clauses 1-6 of Ref. [2] .
Key management is important for XTS-AES, as for any keyed cryptographic algorithm, but the representation of a key backup structure in the Extensible Markup Language (XML) that is specified in Clause 7 of Ref. [2] is outside the scope of this Recommendation.
Consistent with the 2 20 block limit for a data unit, an implementation of XTS-AES may further restrict the length of the data units for any key. For example, an implementation may support only data units that are sequences of complete blocks. In this case, the ciphertext stealing components in the implementations of the XTS-AES-Enc and the XTS-AES-Dec procedures would be unnecessary, and these procedures essentially would be reduced to the XTS-AESblockEnc and the XTS-AES-blockDec procedures, as specified in Ref. [2] .
Similarly, an implementation may restrict its support to either the 256-bit key size (for XTS-AES-128) or the 512-bit key size (for XTS-AES-256).
Restrictions on the supported lengths of the key or the data units may affect interoperability with other implementations.
Conformance testing for implementations of XTS-AES is conducted within the framework of the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP), a joint effort of NIST and the Communications Security Establishment Canada.
Ordering Convention for the Ciphertext Stealing Case
If the length of the data units for an instance of XTS-AES is not an integral multiple of the block size, then the specification in Ref. [2] denotes the unencrypted form of a data unit, i.e., the plaintext, as a sequence of complete blocks, P 0 , P 1 , …P m-1 , followed by a single, non-empty partial block P m , where m is a positive integer determined by the length of the data unit.
In this case, the encrypted form of the data unit, i.e., the ciphertext, has the same structure: a sequence of complete blocks, denoted C 0 , C 1 , …C m-1 , followed by a single, non-empty partial block C m , whose length is the same as the length of P m .
For some implementations, an alternative ordering convention, in which the positions of C m-1 and C m are swapped, may be desirable for the physical storage of the bits, because that ordering corresponds more closely with the generation of the ciphertext. In particular, C m is the truncation of a block that is derived from P m-1 , and C m-1 is derived from P m , concatenated with the discarded bits from the truncation.
Subclause 5.1 of [2] indicates that an implementation of XTS-AES should include a mapping between the pairs of indices that define the blocks (and possibly a single partial block) of a data unit and their physical location in the storage device, but that the mapping itself is outside the scope of the standard.
Thus, if every external interface to the data retrieves the data in a manner that is consistent with the ordering specified in Ref [2] , then the last block and the partial block may be stored in any convenient locations in the storage device. In other words, if necessary, a mechanism for swapping the last complete block and the partial block could be built into the interface.
